WHO WANTED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FIRST PLACE?*
This paper considers certain international differences in organizational and bargaining expense with the aid of an extended model of industrial relations which is sketched at the outset. In this model the prevailing preferences of a nation's workers vis-a-vis radical alternatives to capitalism, collective bargaining, and nonunion industrial relations constitute a critical determinant of employer recognition (or resistance thereto) and of structure, scope, and economic performance of collective bargaining. It is also suggested that various economic and political developments in the postwar era might have been combining to devalue the social role of traditional collective bargaining and to generate renewal interest in alternative systems of determining labor income.
The decline of trade unionism and collective bargaining in the United
States has launched an academic and journalistic growth industry to explain the decline. A considerable variety of plausible explanations has emerged, and that is only to be expected in grappling with a complex historic event. Some of the hypotheses, however, do differ among themselves with respect to their international implications, and their shortcomings are revealed when they are placed in an international context. Explanations that run in terms of economically motivated behavior or of widely experienced changes in the economic environment would suggest that union decline should not be a uniquely American phenomenon, whereas for most of the postwar period it really was. On the other hand, explanations that dwell on international differences in legal and bargaining institutions and political arrangements could treat union decline as an extension of an historic American "exceptionalism"; but developments in recent years suggest that loss of union influence and membership is no longer confined to the United States. Moreover, some of the "exceptional" characteristics of American unions seem even to have created expectations of greater organizational robustness in the U.S.A. than abroad, at least if we are to judge from two questions that have been put by foreign observers. Why, foreign businessmen often wonder, have American businessmen been so hard on the most conservative unions in the free world? And why have so many American workers been indifferent or even downright hostile to unions that have done more things for their members on the job than unions in other countries? Such, considerations illustrate the need to view industrial relations problems more systematically in a comparative and international context and to devise or extend analytic approaches that can accommodate both common and divergent developments in the areas of union recognition by employers, labor ideology and » politics, and bargaining structures and performance. What follows are highly preliminary and speculative comments along these lines.
An extended model
We might start out with the economists in assigning to businessmen a consistently dominant aim of maximizing profits, and also in regarding the tastes and preferences of workers as exogenously determined, although these assumptions are less innocent in some times and places than in others. Profit maximization of course would not preclude union recognition; indeed, when the expected costs of resistance and preemption in a union-free environment happen to exceed combined strike and settlement costs under collective bargaining, profit-driven employers would have to opt for the latter. But they might choose collective bargaining even if it costs more than union avoidance but less than the most probable radical alternative on the current political scene. Collective bargaining would be offered if its availability could sufficiently reduce the probability of occurrence of such an event.
Radical political alternatives are not considered in the standard economic calculus, whether because they are absent from the current American scene or because an individual employer could hardly hope to reduce the probability of a political event by offering collective bargaining to his own employees. In fact it would be to every employer's advantage not to do so and to let every other employer bear the cost of this public good. However, it surely would be in what used to be called the enlightened self-interest of employers to further their class interest by collectively proffering collective bargaining to large groups of workers, provided the negative and positive incentives to do so are sufficiently great.
The costs helping to shape the currently dominant employer policies towards unionism and collective bargaining reflect the currently dominant tastes and preferences of workers.
These must include their relative preferences for alternative institutional regimes governing the employment relationship as well as for the more familiar economic packages of money, security, and reduced effort.
The institutional alternative would range through various forms of nonunionism, collective bargaining, worker participation in management or ownership, and public ownership. They are characterized by varying degrees of "industrial democracy," on the one hand, and of managerial control or private ownership, on the other. The ideological mood of a particular country's working people at any point in time can be reflected in (a) how they tend to rank such institutional alternatives and (b) how willing they are to forego some particular state in favor of a more "conservative" one that happens to be associated with greater economic benefit (at the outset). Let us consider three possible cases that are suggested by diverse historical experience, although they are certainly not to be taken as a satisfactory representation of historic complexity.
Case 1.
Case 1 is characterized by a strongly held preference among workers for socialism over nonunion capitalism, but also by a willingness to compromise on collective bargaining under capitalism should the latter alternative offer a sufficiently promising bundle of economic benefits and industrial democracy. In this case employers may have a collective incentive to offer collective bargaining.
Political left-wingers have invariably tended to blame union leaders for selling out their members under such circumstances, but this interpretation fails to explain how the members can be or remain sold. If instead workers are credited with the ability to make up their own minds, it is they who are doing the selling. Case 1 describes a buyout, not a sellout.
Case 1 can caricature some of the central aspects of industrial relations in Germany, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia over a period extending roughly from the latter part of the nineteenth century to after the first World War. In these countries Socialist-affiliated union movements participated in serious challenges to the political and economic order, which sometimes took the form of general strikes as well as parliamentary political activity; but they pursued conventional bargaining objectives as well. Employers offered united and effective resistance; but they also tended to respond by extending bargaining recognition to the unions.
In addition social insurance was often regarded as a form of political insurance by the business community. Public insurance schemes sometimes originated by the extension of state subsidies to union funds, and this integrated the unions into important areas of policy-making and administration and helped to establish a corporatist tradition affecting the relations among unions, employers, and the state.
The political considerations that motivated employers in these countries influenced the structure and scope of collective bargaining. Employer class consciousness helped to produce relatively strong -employer associations which could offer resistance both to union bargaining demands and to competitive pressure on wages (and hence prices). It could also help to explain the affiliation of large-scale firms (although not all of them) with strong associations, although they typically had less to gain from affiliation than the smaller, weaker, and highcost firms whose interests were strongly represented within associations. The existence of strong associations, in turn, tended to strengthen centralizing influences on the union side, although the latter did not always prevail against separatist tendencies imparted by diversity of political and religious affiliation, on the one hand, and craft organization, on the other. Case 3 differs from the first two in that workers for the most part do not prefer a radical social order to an existing capitalist one, with or without collective bargaining. They may well prefer collective bargaining (and its associated features of industrial democracy) to nonunionism; and, if they do, the strength of that preference will help to determine the costs of operating under each of these two regimes. But since profit-oriented employers have no need to buy workers out of radicalism, they will accept collective bargaining in this case only if its strike and settlement costs are expected to lie below the combined costs of preemption and direct resistance to organization.
This case has been suggested by experience in the U.S., where socialism and later communism never attained the major political status that they did abroad (in part due to the stiff competition that various ideological imports had to face from homegrown antimonopoly populism), and where radical influences within unions could be countered by employer resistance in the arena of industrial relations.
Some American employers and financiers could agree that the pure and simple unionism represented by the American Federation of Labor (another home grown product) was a big improvement over its assorted radical competitors; but, as long as most American unionists seemed to reach the same conclusion, the employers could regard no unionism as the best buy of all. (This is the answer to the question raised by those contemporary foreign businessmen). Left-wing leaders regarded Gompers and his anti-socialist "lieutenants" as misleaders of labor; but they could not claim as supporting evidence the Type 1 political behavior that their colleagues abroad could point to when levelling the same charge against socialist union leaders in Europe.
Employer associations were formed in the nineteenth century, but often for the purpose of resisting unionization. Large-scale employers did not throw their weight behind industry-wide bargaining or acquiesce in social security schemes, let alone those which helped to integrate the union movement into the socioeconomic structure of society. Instead, they preceded and later accompanied their own preemptive welfare policies with direct resistance to collective bargaining via the strike-breaking route, heavily reinforced by the police, judicial, and legislative institutions of the state. And, unlike the feudalistic paternalism that was conducive to union recognition in Britain, such paternalism as lurked within the bosoms of large-scale American employers ultimately found expression as part of a strategy to forestall unionism by maintaining relatively high wages, employment security, promotional opportunity, a variety of pensions and insurances, and the replacement of the pre-World War I "drive system" of management with an enlightened approach that emphasized "human relations in industry." The combination of relatively high wages, on the one hand, and, on the other, of employment security, promotional opportunity, a variety of pension, insurances, inkind benefits, and a "human relations" approach to personnel management that characterized such policies could be more logically explained (as it was by Slichter)
as an investment in union prevention than (as it was much later) as an investment in specific human capital. Elimination of this deficit by another wave of organization in the private sector can no more be ruled out nor better foreseen than the last one had been.
Dem bones could rise again: it is possible that lowered economic horizons, or greater economic insecurity, and shifting demographics could finally induce the white-pink-and new-collar groups to emulate many of their colleagues abroad and in the public sector at home. And the organizational success registered in the public sector would indicate that worker interest in unionism is far from dead, but it suggests that, for the private sector to emulate the public, an increase in union organizing power would require a decrease in the level of employer resistance.
Meanwhile, the Slichterian imbalance may instead be reduced by the ongoing reduction of union bargaining power (as reflected in reduced strike activity and union wage premiums). This should probably tend to arrest organizational decline, although not in industries in which even nonunion firms have been finding it difficult to survive foreign competition.
Postwar Developments Abroad
In postwar Europe the reemergence of other historic patterns has helped to account for different organizational experiences. After having been swamped in some of their original host countries by the great and tragic sequence of depression, fascism, and war, Cases 1 and 2 resurfaced.* Since the late 1970's union membership has fallen relative to employment in France and Italy (the two original Case 2 countries), Britain and the Netherlands, as it had been doing n the United States (and, it might be added, Japan). But membership has not fallen relative to employment in the Scandinavian countries and Canada (where it rose markedly), West Germany, and Austria-all with the partial exception of Canada, Case 1 countries with major social democratic parties and strong and relatively centralized bargaining institutions. The political power exercised by the unions within and through these labor parties has helped to preserve their organizational *To be sure there were important changes from their original states, but some of them tended to reinforce salient characteristics of the prewar configurations-for example, various structural and legal changes which tended both to circumscribe and centralize collective bargaining in West Germany; and the increased power of the Communist parties in France and Italy, whose opposition to decentralized institutions helped to further weaken or retard the development of collective bargaining in those countries. Italy, however, moved away from a Communistaugmented version of Case 2, as a series of major political economic, and social changes (including the rank-and-file strikes of 1969) favored greater bipartisan acceptance of collective bargaining.
base by continuing to nourish a relatively strong community of interest within the ranks of employers as well as workers. As a result non-union incursion into the jurisdictions of strong employer associations has been deterred, first, by the general expectation that new entrants will be unionized, and ultimately by a good chance that any would-be corporate rate busters would find themselves short of labor (by cooperative union strike action), suppliers, business customers, or finance.
Even in these countries, however, bargaining structures have been subject, More. More. More -Sharing?
The most promising way to go would appear to be further along the historic path of industrial democracy. Union-management agreements would feature sharing by workers and their representatives in wider areas of managerial decisionmaking, profits, and financial equity, while contractually fixed components of compensation would be deemphasized. Profit-sharing has been advocated as an instrument for achieving that elusive goal of noninflationary full employment through cost flexibility; along with "codetermination," it offers at least as much promise of yielding increased international competitiveness via lower levels of unit labor costs in high-income economies. In this country, however, both forms of sharing have been urged as a nonunion alternative; but in the absence of collective bargaining, profit-sharing would be arguably unstable and even subversive of the efficiency objectives of co-determination. There is reason to believe that in good times worker capitalists would object to dilution of their equity if management sought to increase their firm's work force (and competing employers would have to bid up conventional wages). And in bad times capitalist workers would object to a reduction of their share incomes, just as nonunion wage slaves have historically regarded wage cuts as breach of implicit contract and often reacted by restricting output and productivity (thereby tending to maintain the level of the "efficiency wage").
But sharing arrangements might be regarded more hopefully as complements, rather than alternatives, to collective bargaining--and indeed they have been so regarded abroad. Workers might be more willing to take the bad with the good and enter into long-term commitments to the enterprise, which would yield greater flexibility in work assignments as well as in money costs, if what they got in return was jointly determined and protected under explicit bargaining contracts. What they could get in return would be negotiated profit shares and possibly more job security as the competitiveness (including the international competitiveness) of their firms was improved by lower contractual labor costs. The adversary role of unionism would not be extinguished; rather it would underwrite the effectiveness of cooperative arrangements. Employers might therefore find it profitable to adopt more positive attitudes towards participatory industrial relations. And the unions would find it advisable to do so, especially if they could recall that on past occasions recognition by management had entailed other major changes in the scope and structure of industrial relations (e.g. more centralized bargaining in Europe and long-term complex agreements in the U.S.). But, again as in the past, management's decision will ultimately be a function of worker attitudes. A new generation of workers, confronted by major changes in their work environments, must decide whether paternalism is a tolerable substitute for democracy and, therefore, whether unions will be given the opportunity to play a more valuable and viable role in the community's economic life.
*Presidential address to the Industrial Relations Research Association at ThirtyNinth Annual Meeting, December 29, 1986, New Orleans, LA.
